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In an opinion paper published in this
journal, Funke (2014) argues that two
different types of assessment instru-
ments for complex problem solving
(CPS), computer-simulated microworlds
(CSMs), and minimal complex systems
(MCSs), might require different types of
causal cognition. CPS denotes the ability
to successfully deal with new, intranspar-
ent, and dynamically changing problem
situations (Funke, 2001) and is considered
one of the most important skills of the
21st century. Given the recent attention
CPS has received from both academic and
educational stances, for instance, through
the Programme for International Student
Assessment, which tested CPS in 15-year-
old students across more than 40 countries
(OECD, 2014), the topic addressed by
Funke (2014) is both timely and of high
relevance.
In this commentary, we will elaborate
on the difference between specific CPS
assessment instruments used in a variety
of research fields (e.g., experimental psy-
chology, educational assessment) and CPS
as the underlying attribute, and we will
offer a view that diverges from Funke’s
(2014). We will express our hope that
different CPS assessment traditions that
are reflected in CSMs and MCSs will
converge toward a generalizable under-
standing of CPS as an unobserved latent
attribute (i.e., a psychological concept)
that is of relevance to researchers from
a number of fields including experimen-
tal psychology and individual differences
research. Before alluding specifically to
Funke’s opinion paper, we would like to
specify our terminology. Funke uses the
terms CPS and MCS for the two types
of assessment. However, CPS denotes a
psychological attribute and not a specific
set of assessment instruments. Thus, we
will use the established terms computer-
simulated microworlds (CSMs) and mini-
mal complex systems (MCSs) for the assess-
ment instruments, and we will reserve the
term complex problem solving (CPS) for the
latent attribute that both types of assess-
ments claim to tap into.
Funke (2014) argues that the useful-
ness of CSMs and MCSs for measur-
ing CPS depends on the field of study.
CSMs, with their realistic and highly com-
plex setup, their many interrelated vari-
ables, and their knowledge-rich semantic
embedding, are best applied in experi-
mental settings, whereas MCSs, with an
analytical approach that is geared toward
reducing complexity and a high level of
standardization, are best suited for (edu-
cational) assessment purposes. This posi-
tion is reflected in the predominant use
of CSMs in experimental and cogni-
tive research (e.g., Dörner, 1980) and of
MCSs in (educational) assessment (e.g.,
Wüstenberg et al., 2012). On the basis of
task analyses, Funke claims that the type
of causal cognition, the heuristics, and the
strategies required in CSMs andMCSs dif-
fer substantially and, thus, do not allow for
direct comparisons between the two.
For any study, it is of crucial impor-
tance that the employed measures—be
they CSMs or MCSs—tap into the con-
struct they claim to capture even though
the measures may differ with regard
to their difficulty or their surface fea-
tures. Admittedly, CSMs and MCSs look
quite different at first sight. CSMs are
knowledge-rich and simulate complex
real-world scenarios such as business
companies (e.g., the Tailorshop) or entire
cities (e.g., Lohhausen), whereas MCSs
are knowledge-lean and less complex. But
can we really conclude, on the basis of
purely conceptual task analyses, that they
tap into different types of causal cogni-
tion? And if so, what is it that they tap
into? 15 years ago, Süß (1999) had already
provided important empirical guidance
on this question with regard to the con-
struct validity of CSMs. He showed that
the performances in three different CSMs
were moderately correlated—which was
to be expected given that they suppos-
edly all measured CPS. More importantly,
when controlling for fluid intelligence
and specific prior knowledge, the cor-
relation dropped to non-significance. In
the terms of contemporary theories on
the human intellect (McGrew, 2009), the
shared variance of three CSMs originated
from fluid intelligence and (specific) prior
knowledge. That is, the type of causal
cognition required to successfully master
CSMs is empirically identical to the causal
cognition required for standard tests of
fluid intelligence. Provocatively, one could
state that the Tailorshop, probably the
best-known microworld included in Süß’s
study, requires nothing but fluid intelli-
gence and inductive reasoning as well as
specialized knowledge about how com-
panies work. Following this, the strong
impact of context in CSMs and the sub-
stantial advantages for participants who
possess this specific knowledge are not
only assets of CSMs that make them more
realistic but also disadvantages that dis-
tort the measurement of the underly-
ing attribute and the cognitive processes
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associated with it. In addition, the high
complexity of CSMs (sometimes up to
1,000 variables) does not allow for a com-
plete causal analysis—an asset according
to Funke. However, this may also lead to
unsystematic variance created by the fact
that subjects have to deal with an envi-
ronment that is basically unpredictable for
them. That is, CSMs may produce unsys-
tematic variance because they are just too
complex and leave participants with no
choice but to either guess or apply some
general reasoning skills that are also found
in classical intelligence and reasoning tests.
And neither guessing nor abstract reason-
ing are distinctive features that are found
in contemporary definitions of CPS as
unique characteristics. Thus, despite their
high face validity, empirical evidence sug-
gests that CSMs may fall short of tapping
into the type of causal cognition unique to
CPS or causal cognition at all—a point not
mentioned in Funke’s (2014) paper.
Indeed, reports such as the one by
Süß (1999) have led to a notable decline
in the number of studies on CPS using
CSMs in the late 1990s and the early 2000s
because they questioned the empirical use-
fulness of CSMs and the existence of CPS
as a latent attribute. It was argued that
CSMs were unable to provide any evi-
dence suggesting that they tapped into
other than already well-known and estab-
lished attributes such as reasoning and
prior knowledge. At the same time, efforts
were undertaken to solve the aforemen-
tioned issues by introducing more formal-
ized CPS assessments that focused on the
core features of CPS such as dynamics,
complexity, and intransparency and that
tried to minimize the impact of unsys-
tematic and construct-unrelated variance
(e.g., Funke, 2001; Kröner et al., 2005).
One of these efforts cumulated in the
development of MCSs (e.g., Greiff et al.,
2013).
Obviously, avoiding any unnecessary
ballast in favor of a focus on the core
attribute of CPS comes at a cost: severe
reductions in face validity. MCSs lack
the appealing and attractive real-world
resemblance of CSMs, which constitute a
much more prosaic assessment environ-
ment. At the same time, we should ask
whether the complex contextual embed-
ding of CSMs has ever been shown to
allow valid conclusions about participants’
abilities to act efficiently in the real-world
context simulated by CSMs. In this regard
too, results are rather mixed because
experience and expertise with the real-
word context do not necessarily war-
rant better decisions in CSMs (but see
also Putz-Osterloh and Lemme, 1987;
Chapman et al., 2006; Elliott et al., 2007).
To this end, we do agree with Funke (2014)
that MCSs lack the appeal of the com-
plex real-world problem situations that
are found in CSMs, but we respectfully
disagree with his notion that MCSs cap-
ture a type of causal cognition that does
not require the use of heuristics (Greiff
et al., 2013) or of sophisticated strategies
(Neubert et al., in press).
Interestingly, the use of strategies and
heuristics relates directly to the question
of cultural differences in CPS. In one
of the few studies addressing this topic,
Strohschneider and Güss (1999) report
that different cultural backgrounds have
an impact on the type of strategy and
heuristics used in CSMs. It is impor-
tant to understand whether such cul-
tural differences originate from different
prior knowledge (e.g., the kind of busi-
ness knowledge needed in the Tailorshop
might vary a great deal across cultures)
or whether they constitute genuine differ-
ences in the underlying cognitive processes
of CPS (e.g., it might be that culturally dif-
ferent conventions impact the way prob-
lems are approached). To this end, data on
the processes taking place in CPS derived
from computer-generated log files pro-
vide a useful tool for further penetrating
the actual behavioral correlates in both
CSMs and MCSs. For instance, Wittmann
and Hattrup (2004) used log file analy-
ses to show that boys tend to outperform
girls in the Tailorshop because of a lower
level of risk aversiveness reflected through
more and stronger interventions in the sys-
tem, which led, in turn, to better problem
solutions.
An abundance of research questions
await answers on how cultural background
might influence the cognitive processes
that occur when people tackle complex
problems. But here again, we should ask
whether these scientific challenges can be
better addressed with CSMs, which are
related to a real-world embedding almost
necessarily bound to the cultural con-
text of the real-world environment that is
simulated or with the more context-free
and perhaps more culture-free instru-
ments provided by MCSs. In building up
further knowledge on CPS, we will need
a clear distinction between face validity
on the one hand and the underlying CPS
attribute and its defining characteristics
on the other. Valid CPS assessments that
serve the purpose of researchers from dif-
ferent fields, whether in the form of CSMs
or MCSs, should be developed along the
lines suggested by Borsboom et al. (2004)
who state that “a test is valid for mea-
suring an attribute if and only if (a) the
attribute exists and (b) variations in the
attribute causally produce variations in
the outcomes of the measurement pro-
cedure” (p. 1061). For CPS assessments,
both questions remain unanswered for the
time being. Empirical rigor and scrutiny
are needed more than anything else so
that the construct validity of CPSmeasure-
ments can be guaranteed, implying a pro-
cess that cannot be driven mainly by the
desire for face validity, however appealing
this facet might be. Herein, we do not see
a dissociation between experimental- and
assessment-oriented studies but a poten-
tial synthesis that jointly works toward
an understanding of CPS as a latent
attribute beyond its specific assessment
instruments.
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